For years, experts argued that President Bashar al-Assad had “won” the Syrian Civil War. Yet that couldn’t be further from the truth. Assad only survived the war, thanks to Russian airpower and Iranian mercenaries.
Now that his allies are distracted, the Assad dynasty is more fragile than ever. This is why a Turkish-backed militia launched its offensive last week.
So how did we get here? Years ago, Russia, Iran and Turkey aimed to end the Syrian Civil War through the Astana Process instead of enforcing United Nations Security Council 2254. Though three of the four main power brokers in Syria (the U.S. being the fourth) participated in at least twenty rounds of talks in Kazakhstan, the interests of ordinary Syrians — who suffered and sacrificed most to reform their country — were mostly an afterthought.
Why were Russia, Iran and Turkey involved in the Syrian Civil War?
Put simply, Moscow wanted to secure its naval facilities in Tartus and its air base in Latakia — to project power in the East Mediterranean and supply its mercenaries in Africa. Tehran sought strategic depth by arming its proxies to insulate itself from regional rivals, including Turkey and Israel. Ankara sought regime change in Damascus, then to stop the flow of Syrian refugees into Turkey, and finally, to prevent the formation of a Kurdish state in northeast Syria.
In May 2017, this troika agreed to establish four “de-escalation” zones to end the fighting in the non-Syrian Democratic Forces and then-Islamic State-held territory. In typical Russian fashion, this so-called “de-escalation” was one-sided.
Assad, Iran and Russia repeatedly violated the agreement, seizing three of the four zones and parts of the fourth. This eventually left most of the armed opposition and nearly 3 million Syrians — including some 2 million civilians displaced by Assad, Moscow and Tehran — besieged in tiny Idlib along Syria’s northwestern border with Turkey.
The most powerful faction, Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, designated as a terrorist entity by the U.S., formed the Syrian Salvation Government. Despite its roots as an international jihadist organization, Hayat Tahrir Al Sham spent the last few years embracing pragmatism by compromising ideologically, building a broad coalition, dismantling ISIL and al Qaeda cells, investing in military development and moderating its social agenda to align more closely with Turkey. Meanwhile, the corrupt and repressive Assad regime, drunk on victory, became the Middle East’s leading narco-state.
Then, two geopolitical earthquakes shifted the balance of power in Syria.
First, Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Moscow initially reduced its military footprint in Syria, from Wagner mercenaries to air defense systems. Russia is militarily exhausted, losing up to 2,000 soldiers per day in Ukraine this past November.
It can’t stop the bleeding in Ukraine, let alone in Syria. Negotiations to end this phase of its war against Ukraine are likely to begin in 2025. Moscow needs all the munitions and men it can muster to make gains on the battlefield and improve its bargaining position before this happens.
Assad read his geopolitical predicament correctly. To reduce his dependence on an over-extended Moscow and a domineering Iran, Assad sought normalization with the Arab League. He banked on the misconception that he “won” the Syrian Civil War and was welcomed back by his Arab counterparts after 12 years as a regional pariah in 2023.
Though I argued this process would go nowhere because Tehran’s influence in Syria was institutionalized, Assad’s overtures to Iran’s rivals might’ve rehabilitated his murderous regime.
All of that changed when Tehran-backed Hamas invaded Israel on Oct. 7. For years, Jerusalem had targeted weapons shipments destined for Iran’s militias in Syria (and Lebanon) with ease and impunity. That was a headache Tehran and its mercenaries tolerated as the cost of doing business.
After Oct. 7, however, that headache turned into an aneurysm as Jerusalem assassinated no less than five Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps generals — Panah Taghizadeh, Mohammad Ali Ataei, Sadegh Omidzadeh, Mohammed Reza Zahedi, Mohammad Hadi Haji Raheemi — in Syria.
Despite abiding by its deconfliction mechanism with nuclear-armed Moscow, Jerusalem spent more than a year degrading both Assad’s and Iran’s military infrastructure while decimating Hezbollah in Syria (and in Lebanon). All Assad (and Moscow) did to help Tehran was to bomb besieged Idlib, driving more Syrian refugees to the border with Turkey.
With Israel’s year-long shaping operation, Russia’s overextension and Iran’s exhaustion, the Turkish-backed and Hayat Tahrir Al Sham-led coalition likely calculated that this was the best time to launch an offensive against a weakened Assad.
Though Turkey’s feud with Israel over the war in Gaza is well-known, their shared interest in weakening Assad while playing Iran and Russia against each other in Syria has remained unchanged for nearly a decade.
Ankara, to negotiate refugee resettlement with Assad — an issue he has refused to budge on — from a position of strength. Jerusalem, to maintain its freedom of action against Iran and its mercenaries inside of Syria. Both have scores to settle with Russia and Iran, revenge is a dish best served cold, and the enemy of my enemy is still my friend in geopolitics.
Which brings us to last week’s offensive. It took years for Assad to conquer Aleppo, and only after Iran and Russia intervened to help him. Now, the Turkish-backed coalition seems to have liberated the city and reached as far as Hama in less than four days.
Even the brightest experts with the best contacts didn’t see such a decisive military maneuver coming nearly 14 years into the Syrian Civil War. Only time will tell where it goes from here.
George Monastiriakos is a part-time professor of law at the University of Ottawa.
